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Abstract
We propose the formal study of governed blockchains that are owned and controlled
by organizations and that neither create cryptocurrencies nor provide any incentives
to solvers of cryptographic puzzles. We view such approaches as frameworks in which
system parts, such as the cryptographic puzzle, may be instantiated with different tech-
nology. Owners of such a blockchain procure puzzle solvers as resources they control,
and use a mathematical model to compute optimal parameters for the cryptographic
puzzle mechanism or other parts of the blockchain. We illustrate this approach with a
use case in which blockchains record hashes of financial process transactions to increase
their trustworthiness and that of their audits. For Proof of Work as cryptographic
puzzle, we develop a detailed mathematical model to derive MINLP optimization prob-
lems for computing optimal Proof of Work configuration parameters that trade off
potentially conflicting aspects such as availability, resiliency, security, and cost in this
governed setting. We demonstrate the utility of such a mining calculus by applying it
on some instances of this problem. This experimental validation is strengthened by sta-
tistical experiments that confirm the validity of random variables used in formulating
our mathematical model. We hope that our work may facilitate the creation of domain-
specific blockchains for a wide range of applications such as trustworthy information in
Internet of Things systems and bespoke improvements of legacy financial services.
1 Introduction
There is little doubt that modern accounting systems have benefitted, ever since the advent
of commercial computing machines, from the digitization of the processing and recording
of financial transactions. The automated processing of payroll information in the 1950ies
was perhaps one of the earliest examples of such benefits: IBM introduced its 702 Data
Processing System for businesses in 1953. And the use of RFID technology or smart phones
for contactless payment of small items such as coffees is a more recent example thereof.
It is then striking that the mechanisms used for managing the integrity of accounts are,
in essence, those developed at least a thousand years ago. What we call the modern double-
entry bookkeeping was already used by Florentine merchants in the 13th century, for example.
Without going into great detail, the key idea is in simplified terms that each account has
an associated dual account and that each credit in one account is recorded as a debit in
that dual account. This allows for the formulation and verification of an important financial
invariant: no matter how complex financial transactions may be, or how many transactions
may occur, it must always be the case that over the totality of accounts
“Assets equal liabilities plus capital.”
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Modern realizations of this method may enrich account entries with time stamps and
other contextual data so that the flow of assets can be better understood, for example to
support an audit. The above invariant may be quite simple to verify, and its verification
may give us reassurance that every debit has an associated credit. But it does not prevent
the recording of transactions that may be unauthorized, fraudulent, or that may be incorrect
due to human error. For example, transaction records within accounting books may be
manipulated to commit fraud whilst these manipulations still satisfy the above invariant.
One may say that processing of transactions is governed by a form of legal code that is
informed by policy on fraud prevention and detection, regulation, compliance, risk, and so
forth. But the enforcement of such legal code within the technical code that operationalizes
modern financial processes has been difficult at best, and too costly or impossible at worst.
Digitized financial processes can, of course, utilize cryptographic primitives to help with
narrowing this gap between legal and technical code: digital signatures can be associated to
transactions (for example embedded within transaction objects), and commitment schemes
can be used to realize consistent distributed storage whose consistency is resilient to ad-
versarial manipulation; see for example the discussion of Byzantine Agreement Protocols in
[22]. But the advent of de-centralized, eventual consistency storage protocols, as pioneered
in the cryptocurrency Bitcoin [16], opened up a new way of thinking about the processing of
financial transactions, even of creating and managing a currency as a unit of account. There
is little doubt that cryptocurrencies are one of the most important innovations [1, 17], along
with the invention and introduction of central banks, in financial services since the advent of
the double-entry bookkeeping.
In Bitcoin, transactions are grouped into blocks, and blocks are recorded and linked in
a chain of blocks – the blockchain. Currency units are created through the solution of a
cryptographic mining puzzle, a process in which network nodes (called miners) compete in
determining the next block to be added to the chain and where the winner will become the
owner of the currency created in that new block. These solutions causally link this new block
to the last one, using cryptographic hash functions, creating thus the resiliency of this chain
against manipulation. These acts of creating currency are treated as (special) transactions
and their outputs are associated with their owners in a (pseudo)anonymous manner – using
public-key cryptography. The system dynamics is adjusted so that, on average, a new block
is added to the blockchain about every 10 minutes.
In Bitcoin, transactions are now technical code. Without going into the technical details,
a transaction can be seen as a program that has a number of inputs and a number of
outputs, each representing a unit of currency associated with some owner. That program
also contains a proof that the program is authorized to rewire inputs to outputs in this
manner. For example, this proof may be a cryptographic demonstration that the program
owns all inputs. Transactions enjoy an important invariant: the sum of currency units of all
transaction outputs cannot be larger than the sum of currency units of all its inputs – and
any positive difference becomes a credit for the miner that created the block within which
the transaction is found.
The Bitcoin network has many nodes that contain a full copy of the blockchain. More
accurately, each node contains a tree of possible chains and identifies one of those chains
deterministically as the real blockchain. The propagation of possible winning blocks and
consensus protocols between these nodes ensure that nodes eventually agree on which of the
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chains they each store is the real chain. This does have its problems. For example, miners
may collude to gain more control of mining competitions and so may force all network nodes
to accept an alternative blockchain as the real one – allowing them to rewrite the transaction
history. Another problem is that nodes need to keep a record of which outputs of transactions
recorded on the real blockchain have not been spent yet in new transactions on the blockchain;
and the above consensus mechanisms for eventual consistency don’t give hard guarantees,
meaning that transaction outputs may be double spent and that transactions in a blockchain
may only be trusted if their block has been linked with a certain number of blocks added
to the chain subsequently. The incentive mechanism of Bitcoin also led to the creation of
puzzle-solving pools of miners and a complex and risky dynamics between such pools, the
development of hardware for solving such puzzles and other factors. Understanding such
dynamics in predictable ways is one research challenge for cryptocurrencies [4].
Another risk resides in the verification of transactions, done by a run-time system that
executes a verification script. Whilst the designer(s) of Bitcoin deliberately chose a sim-
ple scripting language that makes its execution more secure, early implementations of that
system still had security vulnerabilities. There is also a tradeoff here between security and
expressiveness of technical code. Other cryptocurrencies (see Chapter 10 in [4]) seek to pro-
gram more complex transactions (so called smart contracts) to create new financial services,
for example. But these require scripting languages that are Turing complete and are there-
fore much more at risk of security attacks – see the DAO hack of Ethereum and the way in
which this was dealt with as a good example thereof [7].
The risks of cryptocurrencies discussed above suggest that there is value in also exploring
alternative approaches, in which technical code for transactions is more centralized, governed
or controlled by parties with specific interests or duties. For example, RSCoin [6] is proposed
as a cryptocurrency in which central banks control monetary supply and where a number of
distributed authorities prevent double-spending attacks. This addresses or mitigates risks of
de-centralized, open cryptocurrencies but does support a more conventional model of currency
control. There is also the question of whether a central bank would want to risk running any
such system to scale up a currency nationally, given that such technical code may be subject
to security vulnerabilities in configuration, implementation or lifecycle management. But
such risks may be manageable. The oldest central bank, Sweden’s Riksbank, for example,
is actively considering whether or not to introduce a national cryptocurrency ekrona within
the next two years [14].
In this paper, we investigate how governed, closed blockchains can be designed so that
they can support the resilient, distributed, and trustworthy storage of authentication of
transactions within conventional financial processes. Such governed systems with restricted
access give us better control on balancing the use of energy for puzzle solving with the security
of the Proof of Work algorithm when compared with open systems that rely on Proof of Work,
such as Bitcoin. Specifically, we propose that transactions (in the sense of Bitcoin) within
blocks are hashes of transactions (in the sense of conventional financial processes). We then
define mathematical models that describe the design space of such a blockchain in terms of
the cryptographic puzzle used – in this paper Proof of Work, in terms of expected availability,
resiliency, security, and cost, and in terms that reflect that the system is centrally governed.
We stress that our approach is also consistent with transactions within blockchains that
encode transaction history, which we don’t consider in the use case of this paper. We believe
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that our approach has potential. It may, for example, allow designers to minimize the need
for consensus mechanism by guaranteeing that puzzles, with very large probability, have
a unique winner within a certain period of time whilst still maintaining sufficient system
resiliency and security; and this could inform the design of bespoke consensus protocols.
Outline of paper. In Section 2 we present our use case. Our mathematical model for Proof
of Work for our setting is subject of Section 3. The derivation of optimization problems for
these mathematical models is done in Section 4. An algorithm for solving such optimization
problems, experimental results, and a statistical validation of our model are reported in
Section 5, and the paper concludes in Section 7.
2 Use case
The use case we consider is one of a financial process that creates financial transactions. We
would like to enhance the trustworthiness of this process through a blockchain that records
hash-based authentications of transactions, as seen in Figure 1, where the interaction between
the legacy process and the blockchain is conceptually simple – and consistent with the use
of double-entry bookkeeping if desired. Our assumption is that the event streams of such
transactions are not linearizable and so we cannot rely on techniques such as hash chains [9]
to obtain immutability of transactions. Moreover, a hash chain could be recomputed with
little effort by an attacker with partial control of the system. A blockchain is much more
resilient to such an attack as it takes considerable effort to solve the number of cryptographic
puzzles needed for rewriting parts or all of a blockchain.
Our data model represents a transaction as a string input that can be authenticated with
a hash hash(input). String input may be a serialization of a transaction object that contains
relevant information such as a time stamp of the transaction, a digital signature of the core
transaction data and so forth. The trustworthiness of transaction input is represented outside
of the blockchain by the triple
(input, hash(input), location) (1)
where location is either the block height (≥ 0) of a block b in the blockchain such that
hash(input) occurs in block b or location is NULL, indicating that the transaction is not yet
confirmed on the blockchain.
The hashes hash(input) of transactions that still need to be confirmed are propagated
on the blockchain network, where they are picked up by miners and integrated into blocks
for Proof of Work. We assume a suitable mechanism by which nodes that manage legacy
accounts learn the blockheights of their transactions that have been successfully added to the
blockchain. For example, such nodes may have a full copy of the blockchain and so update
location values in their corresponding accounts if the hash of the corresponding transaction
occurs in a block that was just added.
A transaction is unverified if its location value is NULL or if its hash does not equal
the one stored externally as in (1); it is trustworthy if 0 ≤ location and location + k ≤
currentBlockHeight where k ≥ 0 is a suitable constant and currentBlockHeight denotes the
number of blocks added to the blockchain so far. The value of k may be a function of how fast
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blocks are added to the chain on average, to ensure sufficient resiliency of trustworthiness. An
auditor could then inspect any transaction by examining its triple stored as in (1). If location
equals NULL or if location+ k > currentBlockHeight, the transaction is considered neither
valid nor trustworthy by the auditor. Otherwise, we have 0 ≤ location and location + k ≤
currentBlockHeight and the auditor uses the Merkle tree hash in block location (or whatever
efficient mechanism for membership tests is provided in the blockchain data structure) to
verify that hash(input) is in the block of height b. If that is the case, the auditor considers
the transaction to be verified; otherwise, the auditor considers the transaction not to be
trustworthy.
Note that this use case does not require transaction scripts to be stored, nor any run-time
system for verifying such transactions. But the modelling approach we present in this paper
is consistent with use cases that have such script generation and verification support.
2.1 System Architecture
A system architecture that could support such a use case is shown in Figure 1. Unverified
transactions have their hashes propagated on the network. Miners pick up those hashes and
integrate them into blocks for Proof of Work. We abstract away how miners manage their
pools of hashes and how Proof of Work blocks are propagated and added to the blockchain;
this gives us flexibility in the use of blockchain technology. Once blocks are added to the
blockchain, blockheights are propagated to the legacy account. As mentioned above, these
accounts could have full copies of the blockchain and thus implement their own update
mechanisms for value location in triples stored as in (1).
Governed Distributed Blockchain
PoW Server Mining Race
Audits
Transaction
Verification
Propagating
Transaction Hashes
New Blocks
Propagation
Blockheight
Propagation
Blockheader
MerkleRoot,
Nonce,
Prev. Block,
Timestamp,
Difficulty
Accounts/ Nodes
Transaction1 Hash Blockheight
Transaction2 Hash Blockheight
Transaction3 Hash NULL
Transactions
Figure 1: Governed blockchain for financial process authentications. In our use case, Trans-
actions within blocks on the left are mere hashes of transactions listed in Accounts /
Nodes on the left
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Auditors would interface with both accounts and the blockchain to verify, in a trustworthy
manner, the authenticity of transactions. Any transaction that is not verified as discussed
above would be flagged up in this audit. Any pre-existing audit process – which may focus on
compliance, regulations and other aspects – is consistent with such trustworthiness checking;
and the trustworthiness of the pre-existing audit process would be increased as it would
refuse to certify any financial transaction histories that involved a transaction that is not
authenticated on the blockchain.
2.2 Discussion
The approach we advocate here is pretty flexible. It seems consistent with consensus mech-
anisms as used in Bitcoin but it may also support 2-phase commitment schemes as proposed
in [6]. Our system architecture allows for full nodes to be associated with accounts, sets of
accounts or corporate boundaries. Our blockchain does not create any currency, and so there
is no inherent incentive to mine. But there is an incentive for the owners of this blockchain
to allocate mining resources in a manner that establishes trustworthiness of transactions as
recorded in this blockchain. We think that the elimination of incentives and their game-
theoretic implications are a benefit, as are the relatively simple ways of propagating trust
through hashes of transactions. Such a blockchain may also be consulted by legacy systems
to inform the authorization of further financial transactions.
Our blockchain does not spend any funds and so has no problem of double spending, and
double spending in the legacy system would be detectable with existing mechanisms such as
audits. Our approach does allow for double authentication though: a transaction hash may
occur more than once in a blockchain, be it in the same block or in different blocks. We
deem this to be unproblematic as audits would only need to establish some, sufficiently old,
authentication of the transaction in the blockchain to establish its trustworthiness – noting
that hash-based authentication is deterministic.
One expectation is that blocks would only be added to the blockchain if they were signed
by one of the miners that is resourced for this Proof of Work service. This requires that the
public keys of such miners are securely stored and available within the system. Over time,
some of these miners may be removed from such a list (e.g. decommissioned) and new ones
may be added (e.g. system upgrade). Change in the number of miners is then a configuration
change, they would also change the local nonce space for miners in the mathematical model
we will develop in this paper. But such change is locally computable from a new tuple value
(r, s, d).
Let us now discuss an attack model for this use case shown in Figure 1. Other attack
models may apply to such a use case as well, and our mathematical model and analysis
approach is not tied to the particular attack model. There are various actors within that
system: miners, nodes that run full copies of the blockchain, nodes that propagate transaction
hashes to miners, auditors (which may be insiders or external agents with limited inside
access), insiders such as accountants and system administrators, external forces that seek to
infiltrate these corporate networks, and so forth.
We assume that some insiders may be malicious and intentionally try to misuse the system
and its mechanisms for creating trustworthiness. We also assume that external actors may
seek to penetrate this system to then act internally in a similar manner as malicious insiders,
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and that insiders and external forces may collude in such activities. Here are some attack
scenarios of interest:
S1 internal auditors may want to corrupt the state of the blockchain in order to cover up
the traces of internal fraudulent activity
S2 external forces may want to corrupt transaction hashes propagated in the internal
network as a denial of service attack on the blockchain itself
S3 control over a set of miners or nodes that propagate transaction hashes may be obtained
so that certain transaction hashes have priority for mining
S4 classical security attacks such as those on key management may be launched
S5 a miner may amplify its computational power by sharing its private key and mining
input with external computing resources.
Scenario S1 may be part of an insider attack in which skilled and sufficiently autho-
rized insiders collude to commit fraud. The blockchain cannot ensure that only legitimate
transactions have their hash recorded within it. But a security policy – external to the
blockchain – could specify that certain transactions are always recorded in the blockchain.
For example, the hashes of security log entries (e.g. for the editing of security-relevant files)
may also be added to the blockchain.
Scenario S2 is typical for a denial of service attack. The service that is being denied here is
the blockchain, as the mechanism that creates sufficient trustworthiness into transactions as
recorded within legacy system. These threats can be mitigated against, for example, legacy
systems and the entire blockchain network may be placed behind a corporate firewall.
Scenario S3 is concerned with the management of transaction hashes that have not yet
been recorded in the blockchain. The extent to which this is a security problem beyond that
of service availability will depend on the use context of the legacy accounts. For example,
for the attack discussed in scenario S1 it might help internal attackers to have control over
which transaction hashes would enter the blockchain first, with a preference of recording
the fraudulent transaction that changed the recipient of payments of the originally recorded
transaction.
In scenario S4, a cyber attack may get control of the part of the system that provides
authenticated information about the public keys of all used miners, for example, it might
be able to learn a system admin key that allows for the modification of such information
to change the private/public key pairs of miners to values of machines controlled by the
attacker.
Scenario 5 can be mitigated against. For example, a firewall may block all communication
that originates from miners if it does not propagate a Proof of Work on the internal network.
Also, the private key of a miner may be stored in protected hardware so that it cannot be
shared with other devices unless there is fraudulent activity in the supply chain or assembly
of mining units.
Security would certainly be improved in these and other scenarios if all actions of blockchain
management and of financial processes that modify accounts have their hashes recorded onto
the blockchain, be these financial transactions, actions that create log entries, actions that
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give authority to perform financial transaction, and so forth. From this perspective, our
blockchain could also facilitate a forensic audit – not just one concerned with compliance
and regulation.
3 Mathematics for Centrally Governed Proof of Work
Our model assumes a cryptographic hash function h : {0, 1}p → {0, 1}n where p ≥ n > 0 such
that h has puzzle friendliness [17]. The level of difficulty d is an integer satisfying 0 < d < n:
Proof of Work has to produce some x where h(x) has at least d many leftmost 0 bits. We
write T > 0 for the time to compute a sole hash h(x) and to decide whether it has at least d
leftmost zeros. Since the range of d will be relatively small, we make T a device-dependent
constant.
Our probabilistic modeling will treat h in the Random Oracle Model (ROM): function h
is chosen uniformly at random from all functions of type {0, 1}p → {0, 1}n; that is to say, h
is a deterministic function such that any x for which h has not yet been queried will have
the property that h(x) is governed by a truly random probability distribution over {0, 1}n.
We may assume that x consists of a block header which contains some random data
field – a nonce nonce of bitlength r, that this nonce is initialized, and that the nonce is then
increased by 1 each time the hash of x does not obtain Proof of Work. In particular, this
yields that {0, 1}p ∼= {0, 1}p−r × {0, 1}r where 0 < r < p: the input to h will be of form
x = data || nonce where data and nonce have p− r and r bits, respectively. Our use of ROM
will rely on the assumption that mining, be it by a sole miner or in a mining race of more
than one miner, will never revisit the same input again:
Assumption 1 (Invariant) The mining of a block with one or more miners will use an
input to h at most once, be it within or across miners’ input spaces.
This assumption and appeal to ROM give us that hash values are always uniformly
distributed in the output space during a mining race. We now develop the probability space
for mining with a sole miner, and then adapt this to the setting of more than one miner.
3.1 Basic Probability Space for One Miner
Our basic probability space has data and d as implicit parameters, and assumes the enumer-
ation 0 . . . 2r − 1 of values of nonce without loss of generality. The set of basic events E of
this probability space is
E = {⊗k ·X | 0 ≤ k ≤ 2r − 1} ∪ {failure} (2)
where failure denotes the event that all 2r nonce values failed to obtain Proof of Work for
data at level of difficulty d, and ⊗k ·X models the event in which the first k such nonce values
failed to obtain Proof of Work for data at level d but the k + 1th value of nonce did render
such Proof of Work for data. We next want to define a discrete probability distribution
prob : E → [0, 1] with mass 1. Now, we have prob(⊗0 ·X) = 2n−d/2n = 2−d since this is the
fraction between the number of possible outputs that do Proof of Work at level of difficulty
d and the number of all possible outputs of h.
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To define prob(⊗k ·X) for the case when k > 0, we first need to understand the probability
p˜(⊗k) of not obtaining Proof of Work for the first k values of the nonce. For each value
of nonce, the probability that h(data || nonce) does not have d or more leading zeros is
1− prob(⊗0 ·X) = 1− 2−d. By ROM and Assumption 1, these probabilities are independent
from each other for each of these k different values of nonce and so p˜(⊗k) = (1 − 2−d)k
follows. Similarly, the probability that the k+ 1th hash attempt proves work is independent
of whether or not any of the previous k attempts did that – mining never tries that same
nonce value again. But then prob(⊗k · X) is (1 − 2−d)k · 2−d. We thus defined prob(e) for
events e in E \ {failure} such that 0 < prob(e) < 1. Also, the mass of all those probabilities
is less than 1:
∑
e∈E\{failure}
prob(e) =
∑
0≤k≤2r−1
(1− 2−d)k · 2−d
but this equals 1 − (1 − 2−d)2r and is therefore in (0, 1) since 0 < d, r. Thus, we obtain a
probability distribution prob by setting
prob(failure) = 1− ∑
0≤k≤2r−1
prob(⊗k ·X)
which equals 1− (1− (1− 2−d)2r) = (1− 2−d)2r .
3.2 Probability Space for s > 1 Miners
Consider having s > 1 many miners that run in parallel to find Proof of Work, engaging thus
in a mining race. We assume these miners run with the same configurations and hardware.
In particular, the hash function h and the values n, p, d, r, and T will be the same for each
of these miners. As already discussed, miners do not get rewarded:
Assumption 2 (Miners) Miners are a resource controlled by the governing organization
or consortium, and have identical hardware. In particular, miners are not rewarded nor have
the need for incentive structures.
But miners may be corrupted and misbehave, for example they may refuse to mine. To
simplify our analysis, we assume miners begin the computation of hashes in approximate
synchrony:
Assumption 3 (Approximate Synchrony) Miners start a mining race at approximately
the same time.
For many application domains, this is a realistic assumption as communication delays to
miners would have a known upper bound that our models could additionally reflect if needed.
Next, we want to model the race of getting a Proof of Work where each miner j has some
data dataj. To realize Assumption 1, it suffices that each miner j have a nonce noncej in a
value space of size b2r/sc such that these nonce spaces are mutually disjoint across miners.
To model this mining race between s miners, we take the product ∏sj=1Ej of s copies Ej of
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our event space E for mining with a sole miner, and quotient it via an equivalence relation ≡
on that product ∏sj=1Ej. The s-tuple (failure, . . . , failure) models failure of this mining race,
it is ≡ equivalent only to itself.
All s-tuples a = (aj)1≤j≤s other than tuple (failure, . . . , failure) model that the mining
race succeeded for at least one miner. For such an s-tuple a, the set of natural numbers k
such that ⊗k · X is a coordinate in a is non-empty and therefore has a minimum min(a).
Given two s-tuples a = (aj)1≤j≤s and b = (bj)1≤j≤s both different from (failure, . . . , failure),
we can then define a and b as ≡ equivalent iff min(a) = min(b). So two non-failing tuples
are equivalent if they determine a first (and so final) Proof of Work at the same round of the
race. This defines an equivalence relation ≡ and adequately models a synchronized mining
race between s miners.
In the setting of s > 1 miners, the interpretation of events ⊗k · X of E in (2) is then
the equivalence class of all those tuples a for which min(a) is well defined and equals k: all
mining races that succeed first at round k. The meaning of failure is still overall failure of
the mining race, the equivalence class containing only tuple (failure, . . . , failure).
Next, we set
λ = b2r/sc
as the size of the nonce space for each of the s miners, and define accordingly the set of basic
events for s miners as
Es = {⊗k ·X | 0 ≤ k ≤ λ} ∪ {failure} (3)
In (3), expression ⊗k · X denotes an element of the quotient
(∏s
j=1E
j
)
/≡, the equivalence
class of tuple (⊗k ·X, failure, failure, . . . , failure). Also, Es restricts the set of non-failure events
from E in (2) to those with k ≤ λ.
Next, we define a probability distribution probs over Es, consistent with the definition of
prob over E when s equals 1. To derive the probability probs(⊗k ·X), recall p˜(⊗k) = (1−2−d)k
as the probability that a given miner does not obtain Proof of Work at level d in the first k
rounds. By Assumption 1, these miners work independently and over disjoint input spaces.
By ROM, the expression
[
(1 − 2−d)k
]s
= (1 − 2−d)k·s therefore models the probability that
none of the s miners obtains Proof of Work in the first k rounds. Appealing again to ROM
and Assumption 1, the behavior at round k + 1 is independent of that of the first k rounds.
Therefore, we need to multiply the above probability with the one for which at least one of
the s miners will obtain a Proof of Work in a single round. The latter probability is the
complementary one of the probability that none of the s miners will get a Proof of Work in
a sole round, which is (1− 2−d)s due to the ROM independence. Therefore, we get
probs(⊗k ·X) = (1− 2−d)k·s · [1− (1− 2−d)s] (4)
This defines a probability distribution with a non-zero probability of failure. Firstly,∑λ
k=0(1− 2−d)k·s · [1− (1− 2−d)s] is in (0, 1): that sum equals
[1− (1− 2−d)s] · 1− [(1− 2
−d)s]λ+1
1− (1− 2−d)s = 1− (1− 2
−d)s·(λ+1)
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And since 0 < d, s, the real 1− 2−d is in the open interval (0, 1), and the same is true of any
integral power thereof. Secondly, probs becomes a probability distribution with the non-zero
probability probs(failure) being 1− probe(Es \ {failure}), that is
probs(failure) = (1− 2−d)s·(λ+1) (5)
This failure probability is almost identical to that for s = 1, an artefact of our parameter
representation: for example, if each miner has 64 bits of nonce space, then our model would
have r = 64 · s, so failure probabilities do decrease as s increases.
4 Mathematical Optimization in Mining Design Space
4.1 Generality of Approach
We want to optimize the use of s > 1 miners using a level of difficulty d, and a bit size r
of the global nonce space with respect to an objective function. The latter may be a cost
function, if containing cost is the paramount objective or if a first cost estimate is sought
that can then be transformed into a constraint to optimize for a security objective, as seen
further below.
Higher values of d add more security: it takes more effort to mine a block and so more
effort to manipulate the mining process and used consensus mechanism. But lower values of
d may be needed, for example, in high-frequency trading where performance can become a
real issue. We want to understand such trade-offs.
Moreover, we want to explore how the corruption of a number of miners or inherent
uncertainty in the number of deployed miners or in the level of difficulty across the lifetime
of a system may influence the above tradeoffs. We will use tools from robust optimization [2]
and functional programming to analyze such issues.
4.2 Optimizing Cost and Security
The flexibility of our approach includes the choice of objective function for optimization. Let
us first consider an objective function
Cost(s, r, d) = TVC · Es(noR) · s+ TFC · s (6)
that models cost as a function of the number of miners s, the bit size of the nonce r – implicit
in random variable Es(noR), and the level of difficulty d; where we want to minimize cost.
The real variable TVC models the variable cost of computing one hash for one miner,
reflecting the device-dependent speed of hashes and the price of energy. The real variable TFC
models the fixed costs of having one miner ; this can be seen as modeling procurement and
depreciations. Variables s, r, and d are integral, making this a mixed integer optimization
problem [10]. The expression Es(noR) denotes the expected number of rounds needed to
mine a block in a mining race that uses s miners, level of difficulty d, and nonce bitsize r.
The derivation of this expression below shows that it is non-linear, making this a MINLP
optimization problem [19, 10]. We chose not to include in TVC a constant that reflects how
many blocks may be mined within a system horizon of interest but this can easily be done
11
0 < sl ≤ s ≤ su 0 < dl ≤ d ≤ du 0 < rl ≤ r ≤ ru  ≥ probs(failure)
τu ≥ T · Es(noR) ≥ τl δ2 ≥ probs(disputes within µ)
δ ≥ probs(PoWTime > th) δ1 ≥ probs(PoWTime < th′)
Figure 2: Constraint set C for two optimization problems: (a) minimize Cost(s, r, d) as in (6)
subject to constraints in C; and (b) maximize d subject to C ∪ {Cost(s, r, d) ≤ budget} for
cost bound budget. This is parameterized by constants 0 ≤ δ, δ1, δ2, , th, th′, τl,TVC,TFC
and 0 < T, sl, rl, dl. Variables or constants sl, su, s, dl, du, d, rl, ru, r are integral
within our proposed approach, for example when there is a constraint on the carbon footprint
of a system during its lifetime.
We may of course use other objective functions. One of these is simply the expression d,
which we would seek to maximize, the intuition being that higher values of d give us more
trust into the veracity of a mined block and the blockchains generated in the system. Figure 2
shows an example of a set of constraints and optimizations of security and cost for this.
Integer constants sl and su provide bounds for variable s, and similar integer bounds are
used to constrain integer variables r and d. The constraint for  uses it as upper bound for
the probability of a mining race failing to mine a block. The next two inequalities stipulate
that the expected time for mining a block is within a given time interval, specified by real
constants τl and τu.
The real constant δ2 is an upper bound for probs(disputes within µ), the probability
that more than one miner finds PoW within µ seconds in the same, synchronous, mining
race. The constraint for real constant δ says that the probability probs(PoWTime > th) of
the actual time for mining a block being above a real constant th is bounded above by δ.
This constraint is of independent interest: knowing that the expected time to mine a block
is within specified bounds may not suffice in systems that need to assure that blocks are
almost always (with probability at least 1 − δ) mined within a specified time limit. Some
systems may also need assurance that blocks are almost always mined in time exceeding a
specified time limit th′. We write probs(PoWTime < th′) to denote that probability, and
add a dual constraint specifying that the actual time for mining a block has a sufficiently
small probability ≤ δ1 of being faster than some given threshold th′.
4.3 Constraints as Analytical Expressions
We derive analytical expressions for random variables occurring in Figure 2. Beginning with
Es(noR), we have Es(noR) = ∑0≤k≤λ probs(⊗k · X) · (k + 1) which we know to be equal
to ∑0≤k≤λ(1 − 2−d)k·s · [1 − (1 − 2−d)s] · (k + 1). We may rewrite the latter expression
so that summations are eliminated and reduced to exponentiations: concretely, we rewrite∑
0≤k≤λ prob(⊗k ·X) · (k + 1) to λ + 1 summations, each one starting at a value between 0
and λ, where we exploit ∑bk=a xk = xa−xb+11−x . This renders
Es(noR) = 1− y
λ+1 − (λ+ 1) · (1− y) · yλ+1
1− y (7)
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where we use the abbreviation
y = (1− 2−d)s (8)
The expected time needed to get a proof of work for input data is then given by
Es(poW ) = T · Es(noR) (9)
We derive an analytical expression for the above probability probs(PoWTime > th) next.
Note that (th/T )− 1 < k models that the actual time taken for k + 1 hash rounds is larger
than th. Therefore, we capture probs(PoWTime > th) as∑
d(th/T )−1e<k≤λ
probs(⊗k ·X) = (10)
∑
d(th/T )−1e<k≤λ
(1− 2−d)k·s · [1− (1− 2−d)s] =
(1− 2−d)s·(d(th/T )−1e+1) − (1− 2−d)s·(λ+1) =
yd(th/T )−1e+1 − yλ+1
assuming that d(th/T )− 1e < λ, the latter therefore becoming a constraint that we need to
add to our optimization problem. One may be tempted to choose the value of δ based on
the Markov inequality, which gives us
probs(PoWTime ≥ th) ≤ T · Es(noR)/th
But we should keep in mind that upper bound T · Es(noR)/th depends on the parameters
s, r, and d; for example, the analytical expression for Es(noR) in (7) is dependent on λ and
so dependent on r as well. The representation in (10) also maintains that expression
yd(th/T )−1e+1 − yλ+1
is in [0, 1], i.e. a proper probability. Since y = (1−2−d)s is in (0, 1), this is already guaranteed
if d(th/T )− 1e + 1 ≤ λ + 1, i.e. if d(th/T )− 1e ≤ λ. But we already added that constraint
to our model. Similarly to how we proceded for probs(PoWTime > th), we get
probs(PowTime < th′) = 1− (1− 2−d)s·(b(th′/T )−1c+1) = 1− yb(th′/T )−1c+1 (11)
which needs 0 < b(th′/T )− 1c as additional constraint.
To derive an analytical expression for probs(disputes within µ), each miner can perform
bµ/T c hashes within µ seconds. Let us set
w = (1− 2−d)bµ/T c+1 (12)
The probability that a given miner finds PoW within µ seconds is
bµ/T c∑
k=0
(1− 2−d)k · 2−d = 2−d · 1− (1− 2
−d)bµ/T c+1
1− (1− 2−d) = 1− w (13)
Therefore, the probability that no miner finds PoW within µ seconds is
probs(0 PoW within µ) = (1− (1− w))s = ws (14)
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sl ≤ s ≤ su dl ≤ d ≤ du rl ≤ r ≤ ru λ = b2r/sc
y = (1− 2−d)s w = (1− 2−d)bµ/T c+1 0 ≤ bµ/T c
 ≥ yλ+1 d(th/T )− 1e < λ 0 < b(th′/T )− 1c
Es(noR) = 1− y
λ+1 − (λ+ 1) · (1− y) · yλ+1
1− y
τu ≥ T · Es(noR) ≥ τl δ1 ≥ 1− yb(th′/T )−1c+1
δ ≥ yd(th/T )−1e+1 − yλ+1 (17)
δ2 ≥ 1 + (s− 1) · ws − s · ws−1
Figure 3: Arithmetic version of set of constraints C from Figure 2, with additional soundness
constraints for this representation. Feasibility of (s, r, d) and ru ≥ r′ > r won’t generally
imply feasibility of (s, r′, d) due to the constraint in (17)
The probability that exactly one miner finds PoW within µ seconds is
probs(1 PoW within µ) = s · ws−1 · (1− w) (15)
Thus, the probability that more than one miner finds PoW within µ seconds is
probs(disputes within µ) = 1− probs(0 PoW within µ)− probs(1 PoW within µ)
= 1− ws − s · ws−1 · (1− w)
= 1− ws − s · ws−1 + s · ws−1 · w
= 1 + (s− 1) · ws − s · ws−1 (16)
Figure 3 shows the set of constraints C from Figure 2 with analytical expressions and their
additional constraints, we add constraint 0 ≤ bµ/T c to get consistency for the analytical
representation of probs(disputes within µ).
4.4 Robust Design Security
Our model above captures design requirements or design decisions as a set of constraints, to
optimize or trade off measures of interest subject to such constraints. We can extend this
model to also manage uncertainty via robust optimization [2]. Such uncertainty may arise
during the lifetime of a system through the possibility of having corrupted miners, needed
flexibility in adjusting the level of difficulty, and so forth. For example, corrupted miners
may refuse to mine, deny their service by returning invalid block headers, pool their mining
power to get more mining influence or they may simply break down.
Consider 1 ≤ l < s corrupted miners. We can model their pool power by appeal to ROM
and the fact that the mining race is roughly synchronized: the probability that these l miners
win c > 0 many subsequent mining races is then seen to be (l/s)c. We can therefore bound
this with a constant δ3, or equivalently we can add to the set of constraints C from Figure 3
the constraint lc ≤ δ3 · sc.
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We model uncertainty in the number of miners available by an integer constant us as
follows: if s miners are deployed, then we assume that at least s − us and at most s many
miners participate reliably in the mining of legitimate blocks: they will not mine blocks that
won’t verify and only submit mined blocks that do verify to the network. Therefore, us allows
us to model aspects such as denial of service attacks or a combination of such attacks with
classical faults: for example, us = 3 subsumes the scenario in which one miner fails and two
miners mine invalid blocks.
Furthermore, an integer constant ud models the uncertainty we have in the deployed level
of difficulty d: the intuition is that our analysis should give us results that are robust in that
they hedge against the fact that any of the values d′ satisfying |d− d′ | ≤ ud may be the
actually running level of difficulty. This enables us to understand a design if we are unsure
about which level of difficulty will be deployed or if we want some flexibility in dynamically
adjusting the value of d in the running system.
The corresponding robust optimization problem for cost minimization is seen in Figure 4.
It adds to the constraints we already consider the requirements on constants l, c, and δ3 as
well as the constraint lc ≤ δ3 · sc. This problem chooses values for c, l, ud, and us for sake
of concreteness. The robustness of analysis is achieved by a change of the objective function
from Cost(s, r, d) to
Costusud(s, r, d) = maxs−us≤s′≤s, |d−d′|≤ud
Cost(s′, r, d′) (18)
The latter computes a worst-case cost for triple (s, r, d) where s and d may vary independently
subject to the strict uncertainties us and ud, respectively. We call a triple (s, r, d) feasible if it
satisfies all constraints of its optimization problem. Costs such as the one in (18) for a triple
(s, r, d) are only considered for optimization if all triples (s′, r, d′) used in the robust cost
computation in (18) are feasible – realized with predicate feasibleusud : robust optimization
guarantees [2] that the feasibility of solutions is invariant under the specified uncertainty
(here us and ud).
min{Costusud(s, r, d) | feasibleusud(s, r, d)}
subject to the set of constraints C from Figure 3 together with
4 = l < s c = 6 0.001 = δ3
lc ≤ sc · δ3 us = 5 ud = 3
Figure 4: Robust optimization that minimizes cost for the set of constraint from Figure 3,
where up to us = 5 miners may be either non-functioning, refusing to mine or mining invalid
blocks; where the level of difficulty may vary by up to +3 or −3; and where we want that
the probability of any mining pool of size l = 4 winning c = 6 consecutive mining races is
sufficiently small (here δ3 = 0.001). Predicate feasibleusud(s, r, d) characterizes robustly feasible
triples and is true iff all triples (s′, r, d′) with s− us ≤ s′ ≤ s and |d− d′ | ≤ ud are feasible
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5 Experiments and Validation
We submitted simple instances of the optimization problem in Figure 4 to state of the art
MINLP solvers. All these solvers reported, erroneously, in their preprocessing stage that the
problem is infeasible. These solvers were not designed to deal with problems that combine
such small numbers and large powers, and rely on standard floating point implementations.
Therefore, we wrote a bespoke solver in Haskell that exploits the fact that we have only
few integral variables within limited ranges so that we can explore their combinatorial space
completely to determine feasibility.
input : p, α, and values for all constants in Figure 4
invariant: list lists tuples (s, r, d, cost) in descending order for d
1 begin
2 define all constants for constraints in F igure 4;
3 list = [(s, r, d, cost) | cost = Cost(s, r, d), feasibleF loat(s, r, d) is true];
4 list = [(s, r, d, cost) ∈ list | feasibleF loatusud(s, r, d) is true];
5 while (∃(s, r, d, cost) 6= (s′, r′, d, cost′) ∈ list) do
6 case (cost′ < cost) ∨ (r′ < r) do remove (s, r, d, cost) from list);
7 case (cost < cost′) ∨ (r < r′) do remove (s′, r′, d, cost′) from list);
8 end while
9 cm = min{c | ∃(s, r, d, cost) ∈ list};
10 while (∃(s, r, d, cost) ∈ list : cost > α · cm) do
11 remove (s, r, d, cost) from list;
12 end while
13 results = list of first p tuples from list;
14 results = [(s, r, d, cost) ∈ results | feasibleBigF loatusud(s, r, d) is true];
15 return results;
16 end
Figure 5: Algorithm, written in imperative style of list processing, for reporting the best
p robustly feasible tuples (d, r, s, cost) such that d is maximal subject to the cost cost =
Cost(s, r, d) satisfying cost ≤ α · cm where cm is the minimal cost for all robustly feasible
tuples (s, r, d) and α ≥ 1 is a tolerance factor for increasing cost beyond cm. Predicate
feasibleF loat(s, r, d) is true iff all constraints in Figure 3 are true for this choice of s, r,
and d under normal precision floats. Predicates feasibleBigF loat and feasibleBigF loatusud
are true iff their mathematical definition is true under arbitrary-precision floating points
(applying Data.BigFloat version 2.13.2).
5.1 Experimental Setup
We solve the robust optimization problem for the analytical expressions we derived above
with the algorithm depicted in Figure 5. This algorithm has as input the set of constraints, a
parameter p and a parameter α. It will output at most p robustly feasible tuples (s, r, d, cost)
from a list of all robustly feasible such tuples as follows: it will identify the maximal values
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sl = 4 su = 80 rl = 24 ru = 64
dl = 4 du = 64 TVC = 2 · 10−12 TFC = 3000
α = 1.5 T = 0.002 · 10−9 th = 300 th′ = 300
δ = 10−9 δ1 = 1 δ3 = 0.001 δ2 = 0.001
τl = 0 µ = 1/10000  = 2−64 k = 5
ud = 3 us = 5 c = 6 l = 4
Table 1: Constants for our experiments. This does not specify the values of τu which will
vary in experiments. Some experiments will also vary the values of δ, δ2 or δ3
of d for which such tuples are robustly feasible, and it will report exactly one such tuple for
each value of d where r is minimal, and cost is minimal whilst also bounded above by α · cm
where cm is the globally minimal cost. This also determines the values of s in these tuples
and so the algorithm terminates.
Now, having defined the required analytical expressions and the algorithm to report the
best p robustly feasible tuples in Figure 5, we also want to validate these expressions and
the algorithm experimentally. Our setup for this is based on pure Haskell code, as func-
tional – and in particular – Haskell programs offer the advantages of being modular in the
dimension of functionality, being strongly typed as well as supporting an easy deconstruction
of data structures, particularly lists [3]. Furthermore, the arbitrary-precision verification is
handled by the external Data.BigFloat package, which is also written in Haskell. Further
verification and validation of the received results is pursued by unit testing using an arbitrary
precision calculator. Moreover, our experiments ran on a machine with the following spec-
ifications: Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-4650 with 64 cores and 2.70GHz and 500 GB overall
RAM. Our machines required between 322.12 and 261.425 seconds to compute the respective
optimizations. The entire experiment took 10457.58 seconds.
We instantiate the model in Figure 4 with the constants shown in Table 1. We choose T
to be 1/(50 · 109) = 0.02 · 10−9 for a mining ASIC from early 2016 with an estimated cost of
2700 USD at that time, so a fixed cost of TFC = 3000 USD seems reasonable. Let us now
explain the value 2 · 10−12, which models the energy cost of a sole hash (we can ignore other
costs on that time scale). A conservative estimate for the power consumption of an ASIC
is 10 watts per Gigahashes per second, i.e. 10 watts per Gh/s. We estimate the cost of one
kilowatt hour kWh to be about 10 cents. A kWh is 3600s times kW and one kW is 1000
watts. So 10 watts per Gh/s equals 10 · 3600 watts, which amounts to 36kWh. So the cost
for this is 36 · 10 cents per hour, i.e. 360 cents per hour. But then this costs 360/3600 = 0.1
cents per second. The price for a sole hash is therefore 0.1 divided by 50 · 109, which equals
TVC = 2 · 10−12.
We insist on having at least 4 miners and cap this at 80 miners. The shared nonce space
for miners is assumed to be between 24 and 64 bits. The level of difficulty is constrained
to be between 4 and 64. We list optimal tuples that are within a factor of α = 1.5 of
the optimal cost. We make the value th′ irrelevant by setting δ1 = 1 which makes the
constraint for th′ vacuously true. The probability for mining failure is not allowed to exceed
 = 2−64. Setting τl = 0 means that we don’t insist on the average mining time to be above
any particular positive time. The probability that mining a block takes more than th = 300
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seconds is bounded by 10−9. And the probability that more than one miner finds PoW within
µ = 1/10000 seconds is bounded by 0.001, which we also take as an upper bound for winning
6 consecutive mining races. The algorithm reports the top k = 5 optimal tuples – and reports
fewer if there are no 5 feasible tuples. The remaining constants for robustness are as given
in Figure 4.
Let us now specify some values of τu of interest. As reported in [6], Bitcoin is believed to
handle up to 7 transactions per second (although this can be improved [8]), Paypal at least
100 transactions per second (which we take as an average here), and Visa anywhere between
2000 and 7000 transactions per second on average. By transactions per second we mean that
blocks are mined within a period of time consistent with this. Of course, this depends on
how many transactions are included in a block. For sake of concreteness and illustration, we
take an average number of transactions in a Bitcoin block, as reported for the beginning of
April 2016, that is 1454 transactions.
For a Bitcoin style rate, but in our governed setting, this means that a block is mined in
about 1454/7 ∼ 207.71 seconds. Since T ·Es(noR) is the expected (average) time to mine a
block, we can model that we have 7 transactions per second on average by setting τBitcoinu to
be 1454/7. Similarly, we may compute τPayPalu and τV isau based on respective 100 and 7000
transactions per second:
τBitcoinu = 1454/7 τPayPalu = 1454/100 τV isau = 1454/7000 (19)
5.2 Experimental Results
We now discuss the results of our experiments. Each experiment is conducted in three
different configurations:
C1 constants in as Table 1, i.e. δ = 10−9, δ2 = δ3 = 0.001
C2 smaller δ, that is δ = 2−64, δ2 = δ3 = 0.001
C3 smaller δ and δ3, that is δ = 2−64, δ2 = 0.001, and δ3 = 0.0001.
Transactions per second as in Bitcoin, PayPal, and Visa. We show in Table 2
output for the top 5 optimal robustly feasible tuples for the various values of τu in (19) for
configuration C1. We see that all three transaction rates can be realized with 18 miners and
a 48-bit shared nonce space in our governed setting, and this gives each miner a nonce space
of about 43 bits. The achievable level of difficulty (within the uncertainty in us and ud)
ranges from 37 to 41 for both the Bitcoin style rate and the PayPal style rate. For the Visa
style rate, the feasible levels of difficulty are 34 and 35. For the optimal tuples reported in
Table 2, the value of r remains feasible whenever 48 ≤ r ≤ 64. Note that these results also
imply that, for all three rate styles, feasibility requires at least 18 miners.
Let us run this experiment in configuration C2. This models that the probability of
mining to take more than 300 seconds is very small. We now only report the changes to
the results shown in Table 2 for the top rated, optimal tuple. For τBitcoinu , the level of
difficulty drops from 41 to 40 but there are still 18 miners and a shared nonce space of 48
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τBitcoinu (s, r, d, cost) τPayPalu (s, r, d, cost) τV isau (s, r, d, cost)
(18, 48, 41, 54004.4) (18, 48, 41, 54004.4) (18, 48, 35, 54000.07)
(18, 48, 40, 54002.2) (18, 48, 40, 54002.2) (18, 48, 34, 54000.035)
(18, 48, 39, 54001.1) (18, 48, 39, 54001.1)
(18, 48, 38, 54000.55) (18, 48, 38, 54000.55)
(18, 48, 37, 54000.27) (18, 48, 37, 54000.27)
Table 2: Output for top 5 optimal tuples for our robust optimization problem run in config-
uration C1 and with values τu as listed in (19): 5 optimal tuples are found for τBitcoinu and
τPayPalu , i.e. at least 5 values of d are feasible. The problem has two feasible levels of difficulty
for τV isau . Costs are rounded up for three decimal places
bits. This tuple (s, r, d) = (18, 48, 40) is also optimal for τPayPalu now, whereas the optimal
tuple (s, r, d) = (18, 48, 35) for τV isau from configuration C1 remains to be optimal for C2.
Next, we run this experiment for configuration C3, also decreasing the probability that
corrupt miners can win 6 consecutive mining races. For τBitcoinu and for τPayPalu , the top 5
optimal tuples are (s, r, d) = (24, 49, d) where 36 ≤ d ≤ 40. In particular, this requires at
least one more bit for the nonce space and at least 6 more miners. For τV isau , only tuples
(24, 49, 35) and (24, 49, 34) are reported, so this also requires at least 24 miners and a 49-bit
nonce space, where 35 and 34 are the feasible levels of difficulty.
We may explore the feasibility boundary for τu for configuration C2. The robust opti-
mization problem is infeasible for τu = 0.06871 but becomes feasible when τu equals 0.06872.
In that case, the only feasible tuples are (s, r, d) = (18, r, 34, 54000.03) where 48 ≤ r ≤ 64.
Larger transaction rates per second. Next, we want to vary the average number of
transactions ant in a block from ant = 1454 to larger values. This is sensible for our use
case as transactions only record a hash, which may be 8 bytes each. These results are seen
in Table 3 for 50000 transactions on average in a block, running in the configuration C1. Let
us discuss the impact of changing the ant in a block from 1454 to 50000. This has no impact
when 7 or 100 transactions per second are desired. For 7000 transactions per second, this
robust optimization problem still has the same s and r values in optimal tuples but the level
of difficulty (which was 35 or 34) can now be between 36 and 40. This quantifies the security
and availability benefits from packing more transactions into a block for mining throughput.
Let us now see how these results change when we run the experiment in configuration C2.
Now, all three rate styles report the same optimal 5 tuples which are equal to the tuples listed
in the rightmost column in Table 3: (s, r, d) = (18, 48, d) where 36 ≤ d ≤ 40. The results for
configuration C3 are also identical for all three rate styles, they equal (s, r, d) = (24, 49, d)
where 36 ≤ d ≤ 40. So this requires one more bit in the nonce space and at least 6 more
miners.
Feasibility boundary for transaction rates per second. We repeat the last experiment
by varying the ant from 50000 to half a million, in increments of 50000. We summarize these
results as follows:
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Bitcoin ≡ 7 (s, r, d, cost) PayPal ≡ 100 (s, r, d, cost) V isa ≡ 7000 (s, r, d, cost)
(18, 48, 41, 54004.4) (18, 48, 41, 54004.4) (18, 48, 40, 54002.2)
(18, 48, 40, 54002.2) (18, 48, 40, 54002.2) (18, 48, 39, 54001.1)
(18, 48, 39, 54001.1) (18, 48, 39, 54001.1) (18, 48, 38, 54000.55)
(18, 48, 38, 54000.55) (18, 48, 38, 54000.55) (18, 48, 37, 54000.27)
(18, 48, 37, 54000.27) (18, 48, 37, 54000.27) (18, 48, 36, 54000.138)
Table 3: Output for top 5 optimal tuples for our robust optimization problem running in
configuration C1 and with values τu given as 50000/7, 50000/100, and 50000/7000 (respec-
tively). Results for the first two columns are identical with those in the first two columns of
Table 2. The first 4 optimal tuples for τu = 50000/7000 equal that last 4 of the 5 optimal
tuples for 50000/7. Costs are rounded up for three decimal places
• Configuration C1: For all three rate styles and all transaction values in increments
of 50000 up to 500000, the optimal tuples are the same: (s, r, d) = (18, 48, d) where
37 ≤ d ≤ 41.
• Configuration C2: For all three rate styles and all transaction values in increments of
50000 from 100000 up to 500000, the optimal tuples are the same: (s, r, d) = (18, 48, d)
where 36 ≤ d ≤ 40. In contrast, for 50000/x where x is 7, 100 or 7000, we need at least
a 49-bit nonce space and at least 24 miners.
• Configuration C3: For all three rate styles and all transaction values in increments
of 50000 up to 500000, the optimal tuples are the same: (s, r, d) = (24, 49, d) where
36 ≤ d ≤ 40.
Range of feasible sizes for nonce space. We can compute and validate whether a
robustly feasible tuple (s, r, d, cost) has any other values r′ for which (s, r′, d, cost) is robustly
feasible. For example, for all the optimal tuples (s, r, d, cost) we computed above, we conclude
that we may change r to any r′ satisfying r < r′ ≤ 64.
6 Discussion and Related Work
We made Assumption 1 only for appeal to the ROM model of the hash function used for
mining. Implementations may violate this assumption, without compromising the predictive
value of our models. Our Assumption 2 is at odds with Proof of Work as used in Bitcoin. But
it does simplify the reasoning about mining behavior, and makes that more akin to reasoning
about Byzantine fault tolerant consensus protocols [22]: for BFT protocols, network nodes
are either honest (and so comply with protocol rules without incentives) or malicious (and
so may behave in an arbitrary manner). Assumption 3 is related to the assumption that a
communication network be weakly synchronous.
The mathematical model we proposed for Proof of Work did not specify details of the
communication environment in which Proof of Work would operate. It would be of interest
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to extend our mathematical model with suitable abstractions of such a network environment,
for example to reflect on upper bound on the communication delay between any two network
points. This value could then be used to reflect Assumption 3 in finer detail in our model.
Such an extension would also allow us to investigate whether consensus protocols can be
simplified by providing Proof of Work as a service with specific behavioral guarantees.
Let us discuss related work next. In [8], a quantitative framework is developed for studying
the security and performance of blockchains based on Proof of Work. This framework reflects
a range of parameter values such as block size and those pertaining to network propagation,
and allows to determine implications of such choices on security (double-spending and selfish
mining in particular) and performance. It concludes that Bitcoin could well operate at a
higher transaction rate while still offering its current level of security.
In [21], the quest for the “ultimate” blockchain fabric is discussed: getting secure blockchains
that can process high transaction volumes (performance) but do this with thousands of nodes
(security). Bitcoin offers good scalability of nodes, but its transaction rate does not scale.
Dually, BFT protocols [12, 5, 22] can offer high transaction throughput rates but their com-
munication complexity makes use of thousands of nodes impractical. The BFT state-machine
replication protocol PBFT reported in [5] is designed to survive Byzantine faults in asyn-
chronous networks – a proven impossibility that is circumvented with the aforementioned
weak synchrony assumption in [5]. For a fixed number of 3f + 1 nodes, this resiliency to
faults can be realized if at most f nodes are faulty. A current leader proposes a new record
to be added to the database, and three phases of communication arrive at final consensus of
that addition. Views manage the transition of leadership, for example when timeouts suggest
that the leader is not complying or not able to cooperate.
The cryptocurrency ByzCoin [11] combines ingredients from PBFT, from Bitcoin-NG
(which separates leadership election and transaction verification aspects in the blockchain),
and from Proof of Work to devise a hybrid blockchain: its keyblock chain uses Proof of Work
to elect the next leader, whereas the microblock chain uses PBFT style consensus to add
transactions during the current leadership. The network is open (nodes may join or leave),
and the current consensus group is determined by stakes in mining that occurred within a
current window of time. It uses a collective signing mechanism to reduce the communication
complexity within the prepare and commit phases of the PBFT protocol.
A growing body of work uses blockchains for transactions that are not financial as such.
In [23], e.g., a blockchain is used as a manager for access control such that this mechanism
does not require trust in a third party. The architecture of our use case can also support
transactions that are not financial.
The paper [13] discusses the work we reported in this paper in more detail. In particular,
it includes a statistical validation of the random variables used in our mathematical model. In
future work, we would like to support instances of our robust optimization problems in which
not only d, s, and r are non-constant but also other parameters of interest – for example the
time to compute a hash T or the period of time µ during which we want to avoid a conflict
in the mining race. Current MINLP tools don’t support such capabilities at present.
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6.1 Statistical evaluation
We will evaluate our model by comparing its random variables, represented in analytical
form, with empirical counterparts generated through experiments. We make this comparison
in terms of both absolute and relative error.
We ran experiments consistent with Assumptions 1-3 to generate data for testing the
random variables used in our model. Specifically, for a triple (s, r, d) we generated b10000/sc
mining races with hash function Double SHA-256 and recorded their outcome: either a failure
of all s miners to proof work for level of difficulty d or an integer rds saying that mining took
rds many rounds for proof of work with level of difficulty d. The triples we studied where
(s, r, d) in
{4i | 1 ≤ i ≤ 8} × {2i | 3 ≤ i ≤ 7} × {4, 8, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20} (20)
The data we thus generated amount to
(5 · 8) ·
8∑
i=1
b100004i c = 271720
mining races.
Evaluation of Es(noR). Suppose, for a given (s, r, d), that l of these 10000 outcomes where
integers rds. Then the empirical failure probability for triple (s, r, d) equals 10000−l10000 .
For the evaluation of Es(noR), we compute the arithmetic average rds of all rds values
for a triple (s, r, d) and compare this with the exact value of Es(noR) by computing the
absolute error in (21) and the relative error in (22)
|Es(noR)− rds | (21)
|Es(noR)− rds |/Es(noR) (22)
We analyze the absolute error first: for each threshold value x from {0.01 + b · 0.05 | 0 ≤ b ≤
20}, let Rx be the set of all outcomes rds for all triples (s, r, d) whose empirical or analytical
failure probability (i.e. probs(failure) or 10000−l10000 ) is strictly less than x. Then for the set
Sx = {|Es(noR)− rds | | rds ∈ Rx} (23)
function x 7→ max(Sx), seen in Figure 6, renders a discrete graph of the maximal absolute
error from set Sx; whereas function x 7→ 1|Sx| ·
∑
r∈Sx r, named Sx in the same figure, denotes
the arithmetic average of the elements in Sx. For the worst-case absolute errors, we see that
they remain well below 5000 rounds, namely at about 3070 rounds for failure probabilities
< 0.35. In that range of failure probabilities, the average absolute error is about 119 rounds
which is a very small difference. To illustrate, for the time T = 0.02 · 10−9 to compute a
sole hash used above, this would mean that the average absolute error for failure probability
< 0.35 amounts to a time difference of about 2.38 · 10−9 seconds. We did the same analysis
for the relative error in (22). For example, the relative maximal error is then about 0.0323
and the arithmetic average of relative errors is about 0.0069.
In summary, we could show that the random variable Es(noR) accounts really well for
our experimental data, and does so for failure probabilities that even extend into significant
22
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
max(Sx)
Sx
Figure 6: Discrete functions x 7→ max(Sx) and x 7→ Sx where Sx is arithmetic average of Sx
in (23)
ranges such as a 30% failure probability. But it also highlights that modelers need to be
mindful of choosing values for  in Figure 2 that won’t invalidate the predictive value of
random variables such as Es(noR). Clearly, for values of  considered above, for example
2−64, this is a non-issue.
Evaluation of probs(failure). For the evaluation of probs(failure), the absolute error is
|probs(failure)− 10000− l10000 | (24)
where l is as above the number of successful mining races of 10000 overall such races for
triple (s, r, d) that defines probs(failure). The worst-case, maximal, value of all absolute
errors in (24) ranging over all 320 combinations of (s, r, d) is about 0.0118. The average of
the absolute errors in (24) for all these 320 combinations is about 0.00057. This shows that
our model of failure probabilities is very precise, both in a worst-case and in a statistical
average sense when compared to our experimental data.
Evaluation of probs(PowTime > th). For the evaluation of probs(PowTime > th), let the
experiment for triple (s, r, d) have been run on a machine which takes T time (in seconds)
to compute a sole hash. We use T · 2d as a rough approximation of how long it takes to
mine a block. Then we set th = 1.2 · T · 2d as a reasonable test value of th, an increase
of twenty percent. Let q be the number of times that a reported outcome rds for triple
(s, r, d) – which defines probs(PowTime > th) – satisfies T · rds > th. Then we want to
compute probs(PowTime > th) exactly as above, and compute the absolute error
|probs(PowTime > th)− q
l
| (25)
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Figure 7: Graph Max shows worst-case absolute error in (26) for all triples (s, r, d) with
failure probability < x. Graph Average shows the same result for arithmetic average of these
absolute errors
as the difference between the formal and the empirical probability. However, we only consider
data for tuples (s, r, d) for which the constraint d(th/T )− 1e < λ is met; otherwise, our com-
putation of probs(PowTime > th) would result in negative and therefore unsound absolute
errors. This is a valid evaluation approach since triples (s, r, d) that violate d(th/T )− 1e < λ
would never contribute to optimizations in our models. The worst-case, maximal, absolute
error ranging over all triples (s, r, d) that satisfy d(th/T )− 1e < λ is about 0.003. The arith-
metic average of all these absolute errors is about 0.0001 – which suggests a very good fit of
our model with these experimental data.
Evaluation of probs(PowTime < th′). For the evaluation of probs(PowTime < th′), we
now set th′ = 0.8·T ·2d as a reasonable test value of th′, a decrease of twenty percent. Let o be
the number of times that values rds in our data for (s, r, d) – defining probs(PowTime < th′) –
satisfies T ·rds < th′. We compute probs(PowTime < th′) as above, and report the worst-case
absolute error
|probs(PowTime < th′)− o
l
| (26)
over all triples (s, r, d) for which the empirical or analytical failure probability is strictly less
than x. The results, depicted in Figure 7, show that for failure probabilities below 0.35 the
worst-case absolute errors are about 0.00366 and so very small. The worst-case absolute
errors for larger failure probabilities are about 0.041. The arithmetic average of all these
absolute errors is more variable in x: it ranges from 0.000235 for x = 0.01 to 0.00176 (which
is also the maximal arithmetic average over all x considered) for x equal to 1; and these are
very small values. Results for the corresponding relative error are of the same quality and so
omitted.
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Evaluation of probs(disputes within µ). For each triple (s, r, d) in (20), we compute the
empirical probability of probs(disputes within µ) as follows. For each of the ks = b10000/sc
mining races, the empirical probability is p/ks where p is the number of mining races in
which more than one miner found proof of work for level of difficulty d within µ seconds.
For example, the first mining race is represented by the first s entries in the file for (s, r, d)
and more than one miner found proof of work within µ seconds iff more than two of these s
entries are both positive (meaning that failure did not occur) and less than or equal to bµ/T c.
This condition applies to all subsequent mining races, and so p can be computed through
iterated, conditioned increments of a counter.
We use this computation to generate a database of 30720 = 8 · 5 · 8 · (8 · 12) entries as
follows. For each triple (s, r, d) in (20), we consider 8 · 12 many combinations of values for µ
and T where
µ ∈ {0.02 · 10−j | 1 ≤ j ≤ 8} ∪ {1, 2, 10, 100}
T ∈ {0.02 · 10−j | 1 ≤ j ≤ 8} (27)
In particular, µ and T can differ by up to ten orders of magnitude. For each such
tuple (s, r, d, µ, T ) as a key, its entry in the database contains the theoretical probability
probs(disputes within µ), the empirical version of that probability, and the absolute error
|probs(disputes within µ)− p/ks | (28)
as discussed above. We don’t consider relative errors here since the measured values are in
[0, 1]. We then query this database with queries of the form
query(A,B) = “How many entries satisfy A, and how many of those also satisfy B?”
on that database of 32720 entries. Here, A and B are conditions that can be evaluated over
entries, and the result of such a query is a pair (a, b) where a is the number of entries that
satisfy A, and b is the number of entries that satisfy A∧B. Subsequently, we use b100 · b/ac
as the percentage of entries that satisfy A relative to B.
We can use this query form to study how the match between theoretical and empirical
probability changes in terms of s, r, d, µ, and T . For example, for the query
query(d = x, |probs(disputes within µ)− p/ks | < 0.1) (29)
where x ranges over {4, 8, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20}, we learn the percentage of entries whose
(sub)key d has value x and for which the absolute error is less than 0.1. The results for that
are shown in Figure 8.
We can see that empirical and theoretical probability get closer as r increases, and get
less close as s increases, but do so relatively slowly. There is no clear trend for that accuracy
as d ranges between 8 and 20.
Let us next understand how the absolute error behaves when µ is in [10T, 11T ), i.e. when
µ is at least 10 · T but smaller than 11 · T . We therefore consider queries of form
query(bµ/T c = 10.0, |probs(disputes within µ)− p/ks | < x) (30)
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d 4 8 12 16 17 18 19 20
% of 3840 entries 70 88 89 83 84 85 86 86
s 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32
% of 3840 entries 88 87 83 83 83 82 82 82
r 8 16 32 64 128
% of 6144 entries 59 73 96 96 96
Figure 8: Percentage of entries that satisfy the query in (29) as a function of d, s, and r
individually. These figures list the number of entries for which condition d = x is true. For
example, there are 6144 entries for each value of r in the database
where x is in {10−j | 2 ≤ j ≤ 10}. There are 2240 entries in the database for which
bµ/T c = 10.0 holds, i.e. for which 10T ≤ µ < 11T holds. For x = 0.01, 98% of these
entries have absolute error less than x. This decreases to 86% for x = 0.001, with further
decreases to 75%, 67%, and 62% for x being 0.0001, 0.00001, and 0.000001 (respectively).
The percentage stays at 42% for x being 0.0000001, 0.00000001, and 0.000000001. For the
modified queries
query((bµ/T c = 10.0) ∧ probs(failure) < 0.001), |probs(disputes within µ)− p/ks | < x)
the results are similar but slightly worse, (97%, 83%, 70%, 59%, 55%, 37%, 37%, 37%, 37%) for
descending values of x. But these results suggest robustness of our statistical measure, since
these results allow for variability in s, d, and r. This robustness is corroborated by
query(probs(failure) < 0.1), |probs(disputes within µ)− p/ks | < x) (31)
being (18926, 21504) and so 88% of all entries with failure probability below 0.1 have an
absolute error smaller than 0.01. This percentage decreases to 84% when the absolute error
is smaller than 0.005.
Finally, let us report how the absolute error evolves when the ratio bµ/T c increases.
Consider the query
query(bµ/T c = x, |probs(disputes within µ)− p/ks | < 0.1) (32)
where x varies as seen in Figure 9. This shows that the absolute error is less than 0.1 in most
cases even when µ is orders of magnitude larger than T .
Summary of Evaluation. These findings above are evidence of the validity of our random
variables and their use in our modelling approach. But they also highlight that failure
probabilities of mining larger than 30% may require caution in using our approach. Actual
implementations would not want to realize such large failure probabilities in their design
phase. We emphasize that these experiments indirectly depended on security properties of
the underlying hash function.
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x 0 1 10 99 100 500 999 1000 5000 10000 49999 50000
% of entries 90 89 98 96 96 95 95 95 88 83 71 71
Figure 9: Percentage of entries that satisfy the query in (32) as a function of x. The per-
centage equals 70% for all x = 99999 and stays at that percentage for those values up to
x = 5 · 1011 that may change the percentage given the particular keys in the database
7 Conclusions
In this paper we considered blockchains as a well known mechanism for the creation of
trustworthiness in transactions, as pioneered in the Bitcoin system [16]. We studied how
blockchains, and the choice and operation of cryptographic puzzles that drive the creation of
new blocks, could be controlled and owned by one or more organizations. Our proposal for
such governed and more central control is that puzzle solvers are mere resources procured by
those who control or own the blockchain, and that the solution of puzzles does not provide
any monetary or other reward. In particular, a newly solved block will not create units of
some cryptocurrency and there is therefore no inherent incentive in solving puzzles.
The absence of incentives thus avoids the well known problems with game-theoretic be-
havior, for example that seen within and across mining pools in Proof of Work systems such
as Bitcoin. Furthermore, it lends itself well to the development of proprietary or private
blockchains that are domain-specific and whose specific purpose may determine who can
access it and in what ways. We illustrated this idea with a use case in which financial trans-
actions recorded within conventional accounts would be recorded as hashes within a governed
blockchain and where it would be impractical to use hash chains, due to non-linearizability of
transaction flows, and due to their malicious manipulability to pass auditory requirements.
A blockchain design should of course have specifications of its desired behavior, including
but not limited to the expected time for creating a new block, resiliency against corruption
of some of the puzzle solvers, service level guarantees such as a negligible probability that the
time needed for creating a new block exceeds a critical threshold or a negligible probability
that more than one solver does solve a puzzle within a specified period of time.
We developed mathematical foundations for specifying and validating a crucial part of
a governed blockchain system, the solving of cryptographic puzzles – where we focussed on
Proof of Work. In our approach, owners of a blockchain system can specify allowed ranges
for the size of the shared nonce space, the desired level of difficulty, and the number of miners
used; and they can add mathematical constraints that specify requirements on availability,
security, resiliency, and cost containment – such as the ones just discussed. This gives rise
to MINLP optimization problems that we were able to express in analytical form, by appeal
to the ROM model of cryptographic hash functions used for cryptographic puzzles.
We then wrote an algorithm that can solve such MINLP problems for sizes of practical
relevance. We illustrated this on some instances of that MINLP problem. This demonstrated
that we have the capability of computing optimal design decisions for a governed Proof of
Work system, where resiliency is modeled through robust optimization. This mining calculus
also supports change management. For example, if we wanted to increase mining capacity
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and/or mining resiliency, our mathematical model could be used to determine how many new
miners are needed to realize this – be it for the same or better hardware specifications. For
another example, our tool could be used to determine optimal numbers of used miners or
parameters by reacting to new energy prices.
Our approach and mathematical model are consistent with the consideration of several
organizations controlling and procuring heterogeneous system resources, with each such or-
ganization having its bespoke blockchain, and with the provision of puzzle solving as an
outsourced service. We leave the refinement of our mathematical models to such settings as
future work. It will also be of interest to develop mathematical techniques for the real-time
analysis of such blockchains, for example, to assess statistically whether the observed history
of cryptographic puzzle solutions is consistent with the design specifications.
We hope that the work reported in this paper will provoke more thinking about the de-
sign, implementation, and validation of blockchains that are centrally – or in a federated
manner – owned and controlled and that may fulfill domain-specific needs for the creation
of trustworthiness. We believe that many domains have such needs that the approach ad-
vocated in this paper might well be able to meet: existing financial processes and payment
workflows (which conventional cryptocurrencies are more likely to replace than to adequately
support), trustworthiness of information in Internet of Things systems (where the difficulty
of the puzzle, for example, may have to be contained), but also systems that have governed
blockchains at the heart of their initial design (for example, a payment system in which the
temporal and causal history of payments, logs, and audits is recorded on the blockchain).
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